Who is behind foreign fighters infiltrating Uganda?

Uganda is on high-security alert following the infiltration into the country of foreign fighters believed to be of different nationalities from DR-Congo, Tanzania, Rwanda Somalia and Zambia. Whereas Ugandan security broadly describes the group as ‘Allied Democratic Forces—ADF,’ its composition suggests it to be a different formation, whose main objectives remain at large.

Although the nature of the threat is not entirely new and has previously been successfully contained, this time the involvement of foreign fighters and tactics used as well as the sophistication behind it, makes it more dangerous as the exact objectives remain unclear but obviously targeting high-profile people including President Yoweri Museveni whose security detail has consequently been scaled up lately including extra-ordinarily holding traffic flow for too long on highways he uses so that for over 30 minutes other road users are held motionless. The other hypo-thesis objective is to divert the Ugandan army from ‘backing’ Congolese rebels, the M23 who are seeking to capture Goma city in eastern DRC.

Among counter measures to the threat are scaled-up security operations across the country in which so-far four Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) have been recovered in Komamboga, a suburb in Kampala city. Security has also invited the vigilance of civilians to identify and report strangers to authorities. Among the foreigners cited is Ahamed Muhamood Hassan also known as Abu Waqas, a Tanzanian bomb expert. According to the Ugandan military, another key foreigner identified is Swale Abubaker previously sighted roaming between Zambia, DRC, South Africa and other countries.

The M23 connection
The infiltrations into Uganda are coinciding the with the intensified attacks launched by the Congolese M23 rebels against civilian targets in eastern DRC, including a recent one on the Lac Vert and Mugunga internally displaced peoples’ camps, killing 16 as the rebels advance towards the North Kivu provincial city of Goma. This is happening at the time when Congolese politicians and international NGOs are insisting that the M23 outfit is actually backed by both Uganda and Rwanda. Whereas Kampala and Kigali deny these accusations, they are officially unwilling to offer military support to Kinshasa against the M23. On the contrary, the Ugandan chief of defense forces (CDF) Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba has previously publicly expressed support for the M23, describing the group as freedom fighters.

Repercussions
Both the ADF and M23 have been designated by Kinshasa, the UN and USA as terrorist organizations. Whereas the Ugandan army is conducting a joint operation (Shujjah) with that of DRC against the ADF, Kinshasa expected a reciprocation from Uganda against the M23, which didn’t come forth. Naturally, the DRC military would lose the appetite to ally with Uganda against the ADF. That is why, despite the ADF, like the M23 being accused of targeting civilians, the South African allied forces—of armies from DRC, Tanzania, Burundi and Malawi, that replaced the East African Standby force in eastern DRC are not targeting the ADF but only the M23. This implies they have to find ways of engaging the sources that offer support to the M23 in order to weaken it. One of these ways is to offer support to the forces that potentially make the Ugandan military focus more of its energy on threats posed by armed infiltrators, more so as they target high-profiled individuals, including the president. Thus, since the SADC forces are not offering to fight the ADF, they are therefore sympathetic to it, with intentions to redirect the Ugandan army from regional to internal security concerns.

Conclusion
It is discernable that the situation risks escalating to the worst levels of a regional warfare putting Uganda and Rwanda on one side against the SADC forces on the other side. Like previously about 12 years ago, South Africa, a key member within SADC, would provide aerial and intelligence strength, but this time these can easily get neutralized with current technological innovations in the form of drones. It’s also observable that this scare is gaining attention regionally and internationally, prompting recent visits to Kampala of South African President H.E Cyril Ramaphosa to discuss over this conflict with President Yoweri Museveni, which was closely followed by a meeting between Uganda’s army chief Gen Muhoozi Kainerugaba and DRC army’s Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Gen Christian Tshiwewe in eastern Congo on May 6, 2024.

Basis for rapprochements

1. The two insurgents; ADF and M23 have clearly been turned into proxies, advancing interests of other regional powers. Therefore, these powers being more level-headed, should prioritize dialogue to avert a graver consequential escalation of hostilities.
2. The M23 cause should be broadened to include other entities within their geographical location in eastern DRC so that it stops to be perceived as a single ethnic issue because then, it loses logic to claim that only the Tutsi ethnic group among several others in the area is aggrieved.
3. The government of Rwanda should recognize its young Hutu citizens born in exile in regional countries, majority of whom are currently based in eastern DRC so that they are integrated in the political, economic and democratic processes of their country, including this year’s presidential election. Pertinent to note that these did not participate in the genocide 0f 1994 as they were not born.
4. Despite being internationally designated as a terrorist outfit, the same as the M23, the ADF group should be tried for dialogue between them and the government of Uganda for the sake of peace in the region. This model is gradually turning positive for the peace processes in Somalia where elements of the al-Shabab militia were integrated within the new political and security structures of Somalia. The same is positive in Afghanistan following the rapprochement between the US government and the Taliban movement.